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Abstract 
This chapter attempts a step forward in seeking a richer understanding of the dynamics of 
strategic alliances, specifically when viewed from a cross-cultural perspective. We report 
selected materials from a study designed to build a theory of culture and learning in 
organizations based on observations of and open-ended interviews with Dutch and Thai 
employees working for four selected Dutch firms in Thailand. Here we present one of those 
cases, a Dutch-Thai joint venture that thrived by weaving together the many intricate cultural 
webs to achieve a unique pattern of partnership which, metaphorically speaking, became its 
indispensible trademark. The case illustrates how the three levels of culture – national, 
organizational, and professional cultures – could all interlace in a real world setting and serve 
as an instrumental force of success amidst tension in one particular cross-border strategic 
alliance.  
First, we adopt a thick descriptive style of case narration to present the case of a Dutch-
Thai joint venture, Chuchawal-De Weger Internationaal (CDW), painting a portrait of its 
origin, evolution and characteristics. Next, we turn to elaborate on the particular issue of 
cultural crossing, its exact theorized properties, dimensions and implications. Finally, we 
relate the case of CDW to the proposed theory and conclude with a reflection on how this 
case and our interpretation of it illuminate the complex role culture can play in the dynamics 
of strategic alliances. 
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1. Introduction 
 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES inherently dictate ‘crossing’ of cultures. Most 
particularly, when culture is conceived to include, as well as make 
distinction of, all levels and forms it can take – national, organizational, and 
professional, to list the most prominent in corporate world, as asserted in 
Ulijn (2000) – strategic alliances then involve cultural crossing at many 
levels. Although failures of strategic alliances are not uncommon (Park and 
Ungson 1997), impressive cases of success also abound (Mohr and Spekman 
1994), motivating inquiries into the factors behind such opposing stories 
(Kogut 1988; Spekman et al. 1998). How can we explain, or rather 
understand, the dissolution or longevity of such partnerships that involve 
multifaceted crossing of cultures? 
This chapter attempts a step forward in such understanding. We report 
selected materials from a study designed to build a theory of culture and 
learning in organizations based on observations of and open-ended 
interviews with Dutch and Thai employees working for four selected Dutch 
firms in Thailand (Kwanjai forthcoming). The key outcome of this work – a 
grounded theory of cultural intelligence that we label ‘cross-cultural 
intelligence (XCQ) amidst intricate cultural webs’ (Kwanjai and den Hertog 
2008), emerged primarily from evidence in the four thick-descriptive cases.   
Here we present one of those cases, a Dutch-Thai joint venture that thrived 
by weaving together the many intricate cultural webs to achieve a unique 
pattern of partnership which, metaphorically speaking, became its 
indispensible trademark. The case illustrates how the three levels of culture 
expounded in this book – national, organizational, and professional cultures 
– could all interlace in a real world setting and serve as an instrumental 
force of success amidst tension in one particular cross-border strategic 
alliance. 
First, we adopt a thick descriptive style of case narration (Chase 2005; 
Dyer and Wilkins 1991; Eisenhardt 1991; Simons 1996; Stake 1995; Stake 
2000; Stake 1978; Stake 2005; Stake and Trumbull 1982; van der Blonk 
2003) to present the case of a Dutch-Thai joint venture, Chuchawal-De 
Weger Internationaal (CDW), painting a portrait of its origin, evolution and 
characteristics. Next, we turn to elaborate on the particular issue of cultural 
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crossing, its exact theorized properties, dimensions and implications. 
Finally, we relate the case of CDW to the proposed theory and conclude with 
a reflection on how this case and our interpretation of it illuminate the 
complex role culture can play in the dynamics of strategic alliances. 
 
2. Chuchawal-De Weger Internationaal (CDW) 
 
Chuchawal-De Weger Internationaal (CDW) is a Dutch-Thai joint venture 
consultancy providing services in civil engineering field with extensive 
expertise in architecture and building and prospective expansion into water 
and environment. CDW’s portfolio of expertise include feasibility study, 
design, engineering, interior work, construction management, and project 
management. CDW’s services span the range from conception, construction 
and maintenance of industrial and commercial facilities, office buildings, 
civil works, and infrastructure, with recent expansion to maritime works and 
water and environment. CDW has over 30 years of experience in Thailand 
and the South-East Asian region. A recent acquisition of its former Dutch 
parent (De Weger Architects and Consulting Engineers) by Royal Haskoning 
has made present day CDW a partially-owned but independently-run 
subsidiary of this top-notch Dutch engineering multinational consultancy 
group, a status which reaffirms as well as enhances its solid position in the 
Thai and Asian market. 
 
2.1 The origin 
In the early 1970s, a burgeoning Dutch civil engineering consultancy – De 
Weger Architects and Consulting Engineers – won a contract to design and 
manage a construction project for a new head office building for the Bank of 
Thailand. This was of a landmark caliber and an impressive achievement of 
De Weger’s representative: Khun Geert Halsema1, especially since De Weger 
did not even have an office in Thailand at that time and was working only 
from its site in Indonesia. The nature of the civil engineering industry made 
it necessary to incorporate local presence and knowledge to meet legal 
requirements as well as to attain familiarity with native practices. Therefore, 
the Dutch firm sought and found a local partner in Design 103 – a young 
and dynamic Thai architectural firm founded and managed by a budding 
Thai architect, Khun Chuchawal Prempreecha. 
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Although the initial intention of the alliance was only to carry out the 
one prestigious project, the union turned out to be quite a success, not only 
with regard to the project itself, but also, and perhaps more impressively, in 
relation with the resulting synergy of the two partners. Because of this 
success, the two companies decided to develop the partnership into a joint 
venture, CDW. Both of CDW’s parent companies maintained their presence 
and continued their businesses as before – De Weger as an international 
Dutch engineering consultancy and Design 103 as a Thai architectural firm 
– while the offspring firm CDW concentrated itself on exploring a lucrative 
niche market, namely targeting multinational companies that were 
expanding their operations into Thailand and in need of architectural and 
construction expertise to set up their facilities. 
 
2.2 The evolution 
The two decades after the birth of CDW proved to be a prosperous period for 
the new alliance to exploit. The Thai economy was blooming into a little tiger, 
with an influx of huge multinationals, all wanting to establish firm footing in 
Thailand and the neighboring countries. CDW, with the prestige of its Dutch 
parent, could attract an impressive number of high-caliber projects from 
well-known multinationals, particularly those from the Netherlands and 
Western Europe. At the same time, with support from Design 103, CDW also 
steadily secured a stronghold among prominent Thai clients, governmental, 
non-governmental, and businesses alike. CDW’s list of past, ongoing and 
repeated clients reads like a roll call of world-class businesses and agencies. 
CDW grew impressively over the years, expanding its operations into 
other countries in the South-East Asian region and accumulating a 
remarkable portfolio of projects. Even though the Indonesian office of De 
Weger was its predecessor in the region for the Dutch parent, CDW Thailand 
was eventually established as the regional hub of the growing CDW group. 
This was partly due to the advantageous economic and political environment 
in Thailand and partly a result of the effectiveness of CDW Thailand itself. As 
of 2006, CDW had branch offices in Cambodia, Vietnam and the Philippines, 
plus representative or partner offices in China, India, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia. Externally, CDW operated independently from its parent 
companies but exhibited a strong tie with both. It was virtually the operating 
arm of De Weger, as it is now for Royal Haskoning, for the Dutch firm’s 
Asian operations whereas close partnership with Design 103 continues until 
 
8 
these. For all practical purposes, the three firms operate very much as one 
party, drawing resources from one another and capitalizing on the diversity 
of strength within the group. 
When De Weger became part of Royal Haskoning in 2001, the plan was 
to continue capitalizing on CDW’s reputable goodwill in the Asian market by 
letting the joint venture operate independently in its captured market of 
architecture and building while gradually injecting whatever extra 
capabilities the Dutch conglomerate has to offer into the local operation in 
Asia. To the outsider, however, CDW will still be the same reputable 
consultancy, only with even more ‘promise’ that was strengthened by the 
caliber of its adopted well-known Dutch parent. 
As of 2006, the entire CDW group of offices in Asia employed a total of 
400-plus workforce, with Bangkok as the home base. CDW’s office in 
Bangkok (including Design 103) had about 250 employees, most of whom 
were local Thai staff in the middle management, professional (namely 
engineers, architects, draftsmen and construction supervisors) and 
supporting functions. The need for expatriates was only for high-level and 
special positions that require the expertise, seniority or caliber of 
expatriates. Generally, CDW had about such five expatriate posts, including 
that of President, which has always been held by a Dutch executive. 
 
2.3 The characteristics 
2.3.1 Partnership of cultures 
CDW has a robust tradition of the strong Dutch-Thai partnership and takes 
pride in this. The company’s name itself reflects a conscious effort to nurture 
this mutual respect – the Thai part of the name used the first name of the 
Thai co-founder rather than his family name, following Thai convention of 
formal addressing, while the Dutch spelling of ‘Internationaal’ purposefully 
signals its Dutch legacy. This conscious blend of the two heritages reflects 
both a desire and a necessity. Indeed, this unique blend of 
international/Dutch aura and local/Thai fluency eventually renders CDW 
the edge in its target market. 
In the civil engineering consultancy business, what a firm virtually sells 
is a promise – a proposal of a product yet to be delivered. As such, CDW 
operates in an environment where prestige and reputation form the single 
critical success factor. With large organizations – commercial corporations as 
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well as public agencies – as its client-base, CDW’s products encapsulate 
engineering and architectural capabilities, visibly manifested only in 
successfully completed projects, in the form of landmark office buildings, 
prolific production plants, or celebrated public facilities and infrastructures. 
To win high caliber contracts that involve hefty outlay on the clients’ part, 
CDW needs to constantly maintain and build on the image of its capabilities, 
by both capitalizing on past successes and cultivating new 
accomplishments. This requires a harmonious interplay between perceived 
and real qualifications: the alliance must make a convincing impression to 
win a contract, which, once won, must be followed by a finished project that 
at least meets or, better yet, exceeds that impression. Moreover, since CDW 
targets huge projects of high caliber and price tags, from clients that 
operated on global playing field, promises and achievements (or perceived 
and real capabilities) had to make up two sides of a coin for CDW. 
In the same vein, global prestige and local stature also have to reinforce 
each other and make up two sides of yet another coin for CDW. This means 
CDW’s daily operation represents a complex orchestration of myriad 
capabilities. Its core competency resides in its key professionals, the chief 
engineers and architects, whose professionalism and qualification mark the 
beginning and conclusion of a project. At the same time, the supporting 
teams of project management, construction and interior work, and quality 
control must operate to carry out their functions effectively to ensure that 
each project is delivered as conceived, planned and pledged. Additionally, 
CDW also needs to cooperate well with all external parties including outside 
contractors governmental agencies, and most importantly, the clients, 
throughout a project life cycle to guarantee satisfactory completion as well as 
to preempt costly rework. 
Partnership is thus the origin and lifeblood of CDW – partnership of 
myriad actors, activities, functions, professions, entities, agendas, interests, 
or in a nutshell, partnership of cultures at many levels and in many ways, 
shapes and forms. MMM 
 
2.3.2 An ideal match: a tale of two founders 
Sitting now in a quiet, cosy living room of his apartment in Leiden, the 
Netherlands, Khun Geert, the Dutch co-founder, often reminisced about the 
many memorable years he lived and worked in Thailand. He was back ‘home’ 
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now, in a sense, since this country was where he was born and raised. Yet, 
in a way, here was no longer entirely his home, well, not his only home at 
the very least. After over four decades outside of his native land, a large 
proportion of which in Bangkok, Thailand, he and his wife had eventually 
retired to their home country to be closer to the children and grand children. 
To his mild surprise, he found himself having to grow back to the Dutch 
culture. At the shop the other day, for instance, he found himself feeling 
affronted when addressed by a young assistant with the familiar ‘je’ instead 
of the respectful ‘u’2. This would never happen in Thailand. No young Thai 
would behave that way to a man of his maturity and stature.  
This was nothing new to Khun Geert, of course. He had done it many 
times before, this ‘growing into’ an unfamiliar way of living. As a lifelong 
expatriate, Khun Geert learned early on that one had to adapt gradually to a 
new culture if one were to survive and thrive in it. Of his years in Thailand, 
he was glad that the adapting experience turned out to be pleasantly 
memorable. For that, he believed he owed it to a partnership he had with his 
Thai counterpart, Khun Chuchawal, the Thai co-founder of CDW. As a 
matter of fact, Khun Chuchawal has eventually become not only a fine 
business partner but also his lifetime friend. 
To Khun Geert, their partnership was a true partnership, an ideal 
match, if there was such a one. Khun Geert considered himself lucky to have 
Khun Chuchawal as his counterpart in the Dutch-Thai alliance when he first 
entered Thailand. They complemented each other well and operated on equal 
footing. He remembered fondly the usual shouting matches they had had 
over the years and how he appreciated greatly that Khun Chuchawal would 
be comfortable with direct confrontation, without ever making a personal 
fuss about it afterwards, as most Thais would have. The usual shouting 
matches would transpire; frictions get sorted out; and their partnership and 
friendship keep on without a dent, so to say. Things would not have been as 
smooth and productive if Khun Geert had to struggle with the usual 
roundabout Thai way in his dealing with a Thai partner when the business 
was still in its infancy. Indeed, many a time Khun Geert wished that he 
could find this raw honesty in other members of his Thai colleagues and 
staff. The memory reminded him of the one thing he liked about Khun 
Chuchawal – the upfront, say-it-as-it-is style that gave mystery not a chance 
and left the air clear and easy to breath. 
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Hence, they learned to use each other, to exploit each other’s 
complementary quality for the benefit of a mutual business advantage. Khun 
Geert focused his effort on developing CDW for the then parent De Weger 
and he certainly needed the rare, almost ideal, blend of quality he found in 
Khun Chuchawal: local familiarity, Western sympathy, and honest, Dutch-
like, direct interpersonal style. Khun Chuchawal, as a Thai who appreciated 
the value of Western know-how for a still developing economy of Thailand, 
welcomed the advanced technical expertise that he could tap into through 
the Dutch-Thai alliance. More, he could even use the Dutch blunt approach, 
in the living figure of Khun Geert, to achieve certain results with his own 
countrymen when he knew he himself could never do so as a Thai. When the 
‘kraeng jai’3 value could get in the way of business, he would turn to Khun 
Geert to cut through it, since the Thai would not take to a direct approach so 
seriously when it came from a ‘farang’4. Khun Geert, on the other hand, 
relied on Khun Chuchawal to share openly and honestly the local fluency 
that he needed to run CDW effectively. Thus, although heading two 
seemingly different companies: Khun Geert as the CDW’s President and 
Khun Chuchawal as Design 103’s Director, the two co-founders of CDW 
operated virtually as one team, one family. 
Their synergic partnership indeed fuelled the eventual growth of all the 
business entities they founded and managed. It also established the identity 
of the sequel of their initial alliance, in more ways than one. Even when both 
co-founders has retired, the legacy of their intriguing partnership still 
permeates the present CDW/Design 103 group in the very fabric of its 
organizational culture. As for the origin of that legacy, the tie still binds. 
Both Khun Geert and Khun Chuchawal maintain an advisory role in the 
CDW/Design 103 group and their experience benefits the current 
generation. Personally, they remain close friends and enjoy each other’s 
company on a regular basis, while their mutual legacy continues to operate 
successfully and shows no sign of slowing down. 
 
3.  Modes of cross-cultural condition 
 
3.1 Culture 
Culture is a concept that defies universal definition. Any definition of culture 
is in essence a statement of what the definer perceives as its most important 
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aspect (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1963). In our study, we conceptualize 
culture as an intricate web of shared meanings that underlies two basic 
social processes: 1) cognitive processes, which make sense of and interpret 
all an individual encounters, whether material objects, social happenings, or 
mental concepts; and 2) behavioural processes, which comprise action, 
inaction, and interaction, depending on the meanings given to each object or 
event.  Thus, culture is a shared way of being and sense-making that is 
unique to a distinct group of people and can distinguish that group from 
others. 
From this perspective, culture influences how people think, feel, and 
act, not in a one-to-one manner, but through their interpretations of the 
thoughts, feelings, and acts of those they come into contact with. Yet 
surprisingly, with the notable exception of anthropologist Clifford Geertz 
(1993), most prominent cultural theorists have paid little, or virtually no, 
attention to this interpretive influence of culture, which our study has 
shown to be a vital aspect of cultural dynamics. Indeed, in our study finding, 
this interpretative influence of culture is the prime, and supremely 
significant, force in any cross-cultural encounter because it fundamentally 
drives the directive influence. In other words, individuals think, feel, and act 
based on the meanings they give to the objects of their thoughts, feelings, 
and acts. 
 
3.1.1 A cultural onion model 
One widely accepted symbol of culture’s internal dynamics is the cultural 
onion model (Adler 2002; Hofstede 2001; Schneider and Barsoux 2003). 
Although there are as many variations of the cultural onion as there are 
cultural theorists, all variants of the model, ours included, share the 
following fundamental messages. First, culture manifests itself in diverse 
ways, shapes and forms – ranging from the most visible to the least 
fathomable – that may be likened to the many layers of an onion. The most 
easily seen and comprehended cultural layers are those on the outside, 
which include material objects, costumes, verbal and non-verbal languages, 
and architectures. The less visible inner layers comprise institutions and 
various cognitive attributes. 
Second, most theorists would go on to state that all these layers inter-
related in a particular fashion. The most widely theorized relationship is that 
 
13 
the inner layers influence the outer layers, and the innermost layer, or 
cultural core, is the key to all the influences. From this point, though, the 
diverse cultural onion models vary in two respects: 1) what components 
make up the layers and what their relative positions are (including which 
elements constitute the core); and 2) the exact nature of the onion’s internal 
dynamics. We illustrate in Figure 1 the cultural onion conceptualized for our 
theory. It should be noted, however, that this representation of culture’s 
internal components only attempts a pragmatic classification: it is not a 
strict portrayal of the complex abstract phenomenon under analysis. In 
actuality, the relationship among the layers is not a straightforward 
unidirectional correlation, a fact that foreshadows the concept of intricate 
cultural webs. 
 
Figure 1 A cultural onion model 
 
core meanings of …
material and 
institutional 
embodiments
 self
 others
 environments
 (inter-)relationships
cognitive and 
behavioural
expressions
 
 
Source: Authors’ conceptualization. 
 
3.1.2 Level of culture 
Level of culture refers to the external associations of culture and involves its 
properties and boundaries. The property of a culture is the glue that holds a 
cultural group together – a set of unique attributes that identifies the group 
as distinct from other groups. For example, national culture has a complex 
set of attributes, the most prominent of which include geographical border, 
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nationality, legal legitimacy, a political system, an economic system, social 
institutions, and a history, among the most prominent. The boundary of a 
culture is the limit of its properties and hence of that culture. For example, a 
national culture is bounded by its geographical boundary, which is physical 
and definite. However, a boundary can also be abstract and flexible, such as 
that which defines a particular clique or team. Whichever the case, a 
boundary signifies the coverage of a particular culture’s influence and can be 
classified into two major categories of cultural level: the formalized and the 
incidental. These are summarily catalogued in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 Major categories of cultural level and their sub-categories 
 
formalized level incidental level
global
regional (continental)
national
regional (provincial)
sectoral
industrial
organizational
departmental
team
biological
familial/clan
ethnic
spiritual
social class
professional
‘community of practice’
clique
social ~ labyrinthformal ~ hierarchy
 
 
Source: Authors’ conceptualization. 
 
 
3.2 Intricate cultural webs 
The concept of ‘cultural web’ of meanings is obviously not new, having been 
rigorously presented by Clifford Geertz (1993), whose conceptualization very 
much foreshadowed the expanded interpretation we propose here. Two 
concepts underlie this image of the cultural web: a ‘cultural unit’ – an entity 
or group of entities whose individual or collective identity is shaped by one or 
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(most likely) multiple cultures, and a ‘cultural identity’, which refers to the 
combined cultural forces within a cultural unit, whether an individual, 
group, organization, nation, and so forth. Because a cultural unit, even if an 
individual, invariably belongs to or is made up of more than one cultural 
groups or levels, its property can be depicted as a cluster of many cultural 
onions. The underlying condition of such a cultural unit constitutes its 
cultural identity, which has the following properties. First, it is a complex 
web of cultural layers and levels to which a cultural unit belongs, of which it 
is made up, and by which it is constantly being influenced. Second, it is 
always in flux, shaping and re-shaping itself as the unit continues to operate 
in a variety of environments. Third, its focal point of cultural stimulus is 
constantly changing dependent on a particular context. 
Cultural webs characterise both a cultural unit and a cross-cultural 
condition, two constructs that share one critical property: both are made up 
of a multitude of cultural webs – complex networks of interlacing cultural 
layers and levels. Such cultural webs themselves have one key property: the 
exponential complexity that inspired our choice of the metaphor ‘intricate 
cultural webs’. Even in simple situations like one interaction between a 
Dutch manager and a Thai subordinate, the entire event actually operates 
under the forces of a multitude of cultures and sub-cultures, all of which 
comprise many complex layers. Thus, every analysis must effectively 
examine multiple, complex, and complicated cultural webs and all their 
forces. 
 
3.3 Modes of cross-cultural condition 
Because the term ‘cross-cultural’ takes on ambiguous and confusing 
definitions in the literature but serves an imperative choice in our study, we 
must first justify and establish its exact meaning. Traditionally, the term 
‘cross-cultural’ designates mostly its comparative connotation: ‘cross-
cultural studies’ typically stand for comparative studies of different cultures, 
mostly national.  This has to do with the history of cross-cultural research in 
general and cross-cultural management studies in particular, for both of 
which comparative inquires dominated the early phase (Adler 1983; 
Boyacigiller et al. 2004; Roberts 1970). However, recent debate has raised 
the need to expand the meaning of the term to reflect greater sophistication 
in the field. For example, Jackson and Aycan’s early proposition (Jackson 
and Aycan 2001: 7-8) elaborated extensively on the fine distinction between 
 
16 
‘international’ and ‘cross-cultural’ research but still resonated the notion 
that cross-cultural studies involved mostly, if not exclusively, a comparative 
element. Five years later, they moved to argued that although ‘[c]ross 
cultural theory has developed strength in comparing nations (as the cultural 
unit of analysis) in terms of broad value dimensions, … little attention has 
been paid to cross cultural interactions or interfaces as the unit of analysis’ 
(Jackson and Aycan 2006: 10, emphases original). They argued further that 
‘[c]ross cultural interactions and interfaces at multiple levels including 
intercontinental, inter-national, inter-ethnic, inter-group, inter-
organizational levels’ must be one of the pressing issues for future cross-
cultural research (Jackson and Aycan 2006: 11).  Our study’s finding 
corroborates their proposition. 
Hence, the meaning of the term ‘cross-cultural’ must expand to 
designate issues involving different cultures not only from a comparative 
angel, but also, and most specifically, from an interactive viewpoint – namely 
at their interfaces or ‘crossings’. Thus, although the ambiguity of the term 
‘cross-cultural’ in the literature instigated a dilemma during the earlier 
theorizing phase in our study, we prefer the term over its alternative, namely 
‘intercultural’, solely by virtue of the significance of the word ‘cross.’ 
Specifically, the subtle implication of the term ‘cross’ in relation to cultural 
interfaces emerged as a crucial concept in the eventual grounded theory in 
our study, compelling us to retain its use despite the lingering tendency to 
associate the term solely with its comparative connotation. To emphasize, 
‘cross-cultural’ here signifies not only a comparative aspect but also, and 
even more importantly, an interaction element of a cross-cultural 
phenomenon. In this light, strategic alliances such as CDW inherently 
involve crossing in both dimensions – comparative and interactive – of more 
than one culture, and at many levels. Specifically, though, the emphasis of 
our elaboration is on the interactive aspect of the term ‘cross.’ That is, the 
locus of our analysis is not the nature of our focussed entity – namely, 
culture, but rather that of its interactive feature – namely a cross-cultural 
condition. 
What then is the importance of the crossing factor in our 
conceptualization? First, simple dictionary definitions of ‘cross’ usually 
denote several subtle modes of interaction of which clashing is only one. 
When applied to crossing of cultures, in reality many possible conditions can 
result. Our study evidence suggests three distinct modes of crossing when 
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cultures cross or interact: clashing, reciprocal, and hybrid. These modes are 
summarised Table 1 which serves as the framework for subsequent 
discussion. 
 
Table 1 Modes of cross-cultural condition 
 
MODES OF CROSS-CULTURAL CONDITION 
KEY PROPERTIES 
clash reciprocal unification 
DOMINANT CATALYST difference mutuality affinity 
PREDOMINANT  INTERACTION conflict exchange cultivation 
KEY INSTRUMENT controller mediator hybridizer 
STEADY STATE RESOLUTION 
either assimilation, 
division or separation 
combination hybrid 
MATHEMATICAL ANALOGY 1+1 = 1, ½ or 0 1+1 = 2 1+1 > 2 
 
 
Source: Authors’ conceptualization. 
 
 
3.3.1 Key properties of cross-cultural condition 
The first property when cultures cross relates to its ‘dominant catalyst’, 
which refers to the primary force in the interaction. This signifies what the 
actors identify as the salient ingredient of a particular cross-cultural 
condition – the initial or primary engine that motivates their interpretation of 
the thoughts, feelings, and acts of themselves and others within that cross-
cultural context. Next, the property ‘predominant interaction’ refers to the 
most prevailing activity in an interface, which correlates strongly with the 
dominant catalyst. Third, the property ‘key instrument’ relates the primary 
mechanism used in order to carry out the predominant interaction and bring 
about the possible steady state resolution. Last, the property ‘steady state 
resolution’ signifies a state of a cross-cultural condition that is sustained 
over a certain period5. Steady state denotes a sustained but not static 
condition because a certain cross-cultural phenomenon may start in one 
mode but later develop into another mode altogether. Finally, a 
mathematical analogy for each of the three modes serves a simple inferential 
device. 
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For the purposes of this chapter, three important points should be 
made about this taxonomy. First, our theorizing involves no underlying 
judgement about the modes of cross-cultural condition: the taxonomy simply 
reports the range of options and possibilities indicated by our grounded 
evidence. Thus, any assessment of one mode’s superiority to others is 
relative to the situation. What is informative and valuable is an 
understanding of what contributes to a particular situation’s engendering of 
one mode rather than another and the consequences of such a development. 
Second, rather than deriving an exhaustive list of all possibilities, which 
would render the taxonomy redundant and cumbersome, the three modes 
indicate the range of possibilities that may characterize a cross-cultural 
condition. Lastly, these three modes are not mutually exclusive in a single 
cross-cultural situation: more than one mode may (and usually does) co-
exist in a cross-cultural context or within intricate cultural webs. The key is 
to discern what mode is the dominant one for a particular phenomenon 
under analysis and what that entails. 
 
3.3.2 Clashing mode 
The clashing mode is one in which difference denotes the dominant catalyst 
and conflict often emerges as the crux of the interface. This is the most 
recognized and recognizable of all the modes because of its vivid nature and 
persistent prevalence. Indeed, this is the mode identified as the most 
significant by many prominent cultural theorists such as Hofstede and 
Huntington (Hofstede 2001; Hofstede 1980; Huntington 1993). In this mode, 
difference between cultures significantly, if not solely, influences how actors 
interpret and act. By ‘difference’, under our interpretative analytical lens, is 
the difference in meanings given to concepts, entities or acts. The fixation on 
difference often, though not necessarily always, leads actors to contemplate 
conflict, because one meaning will want to exert its force on its counterpart. 
When this happens, the key instrument is generally a sort of controller – 
something that renders one party the ability to govern the situation in the 
direction of its own meaning. A controller can be in any form that ranges 
from formal authoritative power to subtle manipulating tactic.  Whatever 
form a controller takes, its main effect is to establish the meaning in one 
culture as the governing meaning of the cross-cultural situation. In the 
clashing mode, there are three possible steady-state resolutions: 
assimilation, division or separation. Assimilation occurs when one cultural 
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meaning totally subsumes the other(s), thereby effectively eradicating the 
forces of all other competing meanings. Division results when the differing 
actors from different cultures maintain their own meanings but still operate 
in the cross-cultural context in which conflict persists. Separation transpires 
when actors from all involving cultures go their separate way, terminating 
the cross-cultural condition altogether. 
Obviously there are numerous everyday examples of the clashing cross-
cultural mode. The one identified by Huntington, for example, is believed by 
many to characterize today’s world affair according to his proposed thesis 
(Huntington 1996a; Huntington 1993; Huntington 1996b). The clash of 
civilizations theory, in brief, predicts international relations to operate with 
cultural difference as the key catalyst and conflict persists and characterises 
the relationship among major cultures of the world. Hofstede’s work provided 
countless examples illuminating how difference among cultures in 
organizations and societies could result in vivid tension (Hofstede 2001; 
Hofstede 1980; Hofstede and Hofstede 2005). 
Summarily, the clashing mode is the most prevalent mode and 
invariably exists in most cross-cultural conditions, especially at the initial 
crossing stage, but not necessarily as the only lasting dominant mode. Even 
so, in many cross-cultural encounters, this mode could so persist that it 
then becomes the dominant mode.  
 
3.3.3 Reciprocal mode 
The reciprocal mode has some sort of mutuality as its main force. In this 
mode, the focus of the actors involves some kind of mutual interest, desire, 
need, goal, and the like. Thus, mutuality refers to a common target that can 
only be achieved by having actors from the different cultures contributing 
inputs that are unique to their own cultures. Such a situation occurs when 
actors from each of the cultures have what the others do not have by virtue 
of their distinctive cultural heritage. In this mode of crossing, the focus of 
the interaction is mainly exchange, meaning straightforward give and take, 
where some sort of mediator is the key instrument. Actors from one culture 
give what those from other culture need but lack, and vice versa, in order for 
all to achieve a mutual target – hence the label reciprocal. The steady state 
resolution of a reciprocal cross-cultural condition is a straigthforward 
combination of cultural meanings that retain the essence of their original 
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cultural sources, without critical change or adaptation. In simple term, this 
is an uncomplicated case of one plus one equal two, as in basic 
mathematics. 
This second crossing mode is less easily recognizable but exists more 
often than most people realize. The case of CDW, the odd-eyed cat, is a vivid 
example of such a cross-cultural condition. CDW thrives on a reciprocal 
cross-cultural condition because its key strategy and trademark, local 
fluency with international expertise, is a mutual target of all concerned and 
can only be achieved by having each of its key cultural groups, particularly 
the national cultures Dutch and Thai, retaining or even brandishing its own 
cultural essence – an issue to be revisited in subsequent sections.  
 
3.3.4 Unification mode 
In the unification mode, actors’ affinity with the meanings in the other 
culture denotes the dominant catalyst. This mode is, in a simple sense, the 
reverse of the clashing mode and one step beyond the reciprocal mode. In 
this mode, actors in a culture discern that actors from the other culture 
have different meaning than that in their own, yet find it to be more 
admirable and desirable. Thus, in this mode, what is reciprocal is a 
fundamental affinity between actors from different cultures, each admiring, 
not merely in want or need of, elements or meanings in the other culture 
that do not exist in its own. In this mode, the predominant interaction is 
cultivation, because actors will attempt to assume the desirable meaning and 
make them part of their system of meanings. For this cultivation, a sort of 
hybridizer is the needed instrument. A hybridizer signifies a mechanism that 
fuses various competing meanings into one new system of meanings 
altogether. Such fusion evolves from genuine appreciation and aims at 
creating a new fused meaning hitherto not in existence. A hybrid entity – a 
novel entity entirely – then emerges as a result of this cultivation. 
A cross-cultural unification and its hybrid creation may be more 
common in everyday life than most would imagine. An immigrant, who is 
well received by and has integrated well in a new country, is a good example. 
Such an individual has developed a new national cultural identity, at his 
own individual level, that is neither his birth culture nor the adopted one, 
but actually a fusion of both. His new cultural identity reflects some cultural 
traits from his own motherland, some from the adopted country, and some 
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totally new but with influences from both. A successful mixed marriage is 
another everyday life example. In such a household, elements from all 
involved cultures blend together to form a new unique household, a hybrid 
cultural group. 
 
4. CDW as an odd-eyed cat 
 
Given the above view of modes of cross-cultural condition, we locate CDW, at 
the time of our narration, as a curious combination of cultures – an instance 
of the reciprocal mode. If CDW were to be a biological entity, its appearance 
would probably carry a telltale sign of its reciprocal cultural steady state 
resolution. CDW might then be akin to those peculiar creatures, the odd-
eyed cats (ones with each eye being a different color, such as one blue eye 
and one orange or copper eye). This is a striking but apt analogy, for CDW 
thrived on an odd combination of various partnerships: odd in that all the 
partnerships at CDW were based on one crucial characteristic: the need for 
each partner to uphold its own unique quality while contending with and 
exploiting the unique quality of the other partner(s) at the same time. In 
such a particular form of partnership, if one partner were to be completely 
absorbed into the other’s identity (either through assimilation or 
hybridization), the partnership itself would no longer work, hence the 
aptness of the odd-eyed cat analogy – each eye needs to retain its distinct 
color, for the creature to earn the title of an odd-eyed cat. This may sound 
rather obscure, so let us scrutinize the many odd-eyed partnerships at CDW. 
 
4.1 Partnership of nationals 
A key policy at CDW was always, as Khun Karel Westerveld, CDW President, 
put it, ‘local expertise with international standard’. In simple terms, ‘local’ 
meant Thai while ‘international’ meant Dutch or Western (as a touchstone 
for international standard). But what did the policy really mean in real 
terms? 
The requisite need for local expertise was driven of course by the nature 
of the industry the alliance operated in. For one thing, in the construction 
and architectural industry (as in other professional fields such as law, 
medicine, and accounting), legality always mandates locally certified 
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professionalism, the very first reason why Khun Geert needed the locally 
certified architect, Khun Chuchawal, to ‘sign off’ their initial landmark 
project. However, legality is but the tip of the iceberg since local expertise 
also involves an on-the-ground familiarity with local practices, preferences, 
and quirks, some of which are too subtle for an outsider to recognize, let 
alone appreciate. 
To give an obvious example, even though the Thai do not subscribe 
strictly to such belief as the Chinese ‘feng shui’6, they do observe a looser 
form of such practice. A building front gate needs to be positioned in such 
and such a way in order to induce stability and prosperity. Internal 
arrangement of different types of rooms and spaces should follow certain 
principles to ensure physical and spiritual harmony. One does not sleep with 
one’s head towards the South or the West; else one may be subject to 
inferiority or misfortune (because another meaning of the Thai word ‘South’ 
is ‘to be under’ while that of ‘West’ is ‘to fall’). Certain colors are not to be 
used for such and such spaces or purposes. And so on, so forth. Thus, it is 
not uncommon in Thailand to have a building torn down or renovated to 
‘correct’ spiritual (not physical) mistakes. As a result, a religious-cum-
spiritual ceremony performed on sites always marks the inauguration of a 
construction project, particularly a major one. This ritual requires an 
involvement of many experts in diverse specialized teachings, an occasion 
that would pose average foreigners quite a challenge to orchestrate. No 
wonder CDW needed local expertise to help carry out its business. Ignorance 
or inobservance of such seemingly immaterial familiarity could spell 
disaster. And this represents but one example of the many instances of local 
familiarity that played a subtle yet influential role in the daily operation of 
CDW. 
On the other hand, CDW’s particular choice of niche market compelled 
the need for an international caliber. CDW’s clients comprised major players 
in the global scene, the majority of whom were big name multinationals that 
needed to observe international standard in all its facets, particularly that of 
industrial, environmental, and quality control. The Dutch ownership of CDW 
in effect created a trademark of international standard for the alliance. 
Indeed, as Khun Chaowalit Saenamuang, one of CDW’s key Project 
Managers, put it: ‘When I deal with Western clients, I’m practically selling 
‘farangs’ or ‘Westerness’ if you know what I mean. To be honest, I think some 
of the Thai engineers and architects may be better at their functional tasks 
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than their expatriate counterparts may, well, at least better at those here in 
Thailand for sure. But I can’t sell Thainess to the ‘farangs’. They won’t buy 
it. It’s just a fact of life and you’ve simply got to take it or leave it.’ So, for 
many such projects, Khun Chaowalit needed to put upfront the appropriate 
expatriate professionals to cultivate the expatriate clients’ trust. These 
expatriate professionals of course earned expatriate pay, which drove up 
project costs considerably. Still, the majority of CDW’s multinational clients 
were more than willing to pay higher prices for such a trademark. It did not 
really matter if in many cases the actual projects might make heavy use of 
the internal Thai expertise at CDW, or Design 103. First was to secure a 
project. And if it took the expatriate’ stamp for that, so be it. 
But international standard was in many senses more than just a literal 
stamp. As with local expertise, CDW’s tie with Western know-how and 
practices also carried a unique quality of material value. In an industry 
where advance in technology is critical, Western experience and know-how 
did give CDW a cutting edge. Khun Geert, the Dutch co-founder, 
remembered how he needed to bring people in from the Netherlands to train 
his Thai professionals on CAD/CAM technology during the early years. Khun 
Chuchawal, the Thai co-founder, valued the Dutch-Thai partnership, first 
and foremost, because he knew that it was the best way to tap into Western 
know-how and move Thailand forward. Khun Karel, the current President, 
knew for certain that in some areas, such as quality control or the 
specialized field of water and environment, the Thai had quite a bit to learn 
from the Dutch. Khun Chaowalit himself professed genuine respect for the 
Dutch expertise with waterworks. 
And that is that. The Thai are good at some things and the Dutch at 
others. At CDW, they both needed each other’s unique quality to create the 
unique blend of cultural identity. More, each needed to excel at their quality 
in order to reinforce the eventual combined identity, at least at the 
‘appearance’ level, and more importantly at a more profound level. Still, the 
odd-eyed appearance could be a cause of unavoidable rift and tension. Two 
Thai employees, Khun Chaowalit, the Project Manager and Khun Busara 
Navarat, Executive Secretary to the President, for example, witnessed on a 
regular basis how such ‘keeping up appearances’ could cause resentment 
among the Thai staff and create friction between the local and the expatriate. 
Looking from the Dutch expatriates’ view, the higher prestige and pay 
were of course not much more than they would earn in the Netherlands. It 
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would make no ‘Dutch’ sense, at the very least, to expect them to be 
rewarded the same rate as the local Thai. Most qualified Dutch professionals 
would expect at least the same reward they would get in the Netherlands, if 
not more, for coming to work in a foreign country. With the cost of living in 
the Netherlands and Thailand being starkly different, this situation would 
not change any time soon. 
Still, many fine Thai engineers and architects at CDW could not help 
feeling it was not quite fair for them to earn a lot less for the same type of 
work (that they were often better at) simply because they were Thai. Khun 
Busara sympathized very much with her Thai colleagues. They were quality 
people and their loyalty to their professions and the alliance was 
unquestionable. She understood their sentiment perfectly and it pained her 
to witness the undercurrent of this ‘double standard’. She questioned 
whether the need to impress Western clients was justification enough for the 
double standard and even if it was, that still did not make the situation any 
less unfair. Khun Chaowalit couldn’t agree more. A fine Thai engineer 
himself, he could hold his own with any Westerner in his functional 
capability. Yet, he could not have secured as many prestigious projects as he 
had done, if he had not had the ‘Westerness’ as a trademark of his ware. 
Trademark was nothing but appearance, of course. But it was somehow an 
appearance that was more than skin-deep. It would have been fine, of 
course, if business would allow CDW to upgrade all Thai professionals to 
earn the same as their expatriate counterparts. Yet, that would surely render 
CDW’s service ridiculously expensive and utterly uncompetitive in the Thai 
and Asian market. At the end of the day, it was the bottom line that counted 
and Khun Chaowalit’s job hinged on the kind of bottom line that 
necessitated the double standard. So double standard it must be, then. 
Odd as it is, the odd-eyed quality that CDW boasted was unavoidable as 
well as indispensable, even though it may be a cause for many concerns. As 
Khun Chaowalit put it, ‘It’s just a fact of life and you’ve simply got to take it 
or leave it!’ 
 
4.2 Partnership of professionals 
Unfortunately, the inevitable friction between the Thai employees and Dutch 
expatriates was not the only tension Khun Chaowalit had to deal with. As a 
project manager, he also had to orchestrate the many departments within 
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the group so that they worked in harmony and brought each and every 
project to a successful completion. He would not say it was a simple task. 
For one thing, he was constantly spinning at the center of all functional 
divisions: conception and design, budgeting, procurement, construction, 
interior work, and quality control. In effect, as a project manager, Khun 
Chaowalit operated at the hub of the many partnerships of professionals and 
functions at CDW. 
Of course, each profession has its own professional culture that influences 
the beliefs, values and norms of the community and informs their attitudes 
and behaviors. Thus, at CDW, tension emerged whenever two or more 
professional groups needed to come together and cross each other’s 
comfortable zones, signifying another crossing of ‘cultures – ‘professional’ 
cultures, that is – which Khun Chaowalit must turn into a partnership 
rather than a combat. This partnership of professionals had the same 
principle that drove the partnership of nationals at CDW, that is, each 
professional group must excel at its own expertise while contending with and 
exploiting the unique expertise of the other partner(s). 
Let’s take the case of procurement and quality control as a vivid 
example. Procurement people’s main concern was to keep to the budget and 
schedule. Not that they were eager to sacrifice quality but their foremost 
‘bottom line’ items were first the timely and correct delivery of materials and, 
second and most importantly, the cut-and-dry figures in the final project 
account. Therefore, cutting corner might come into play, compelling quality 
control professionals to step in and have their say. Indeed, the interplay 
between budget, time and quality control could easily make or break a 
project. Khun Chaowalit, again as project manager, must make sure that an 
optimal balance was struck, with the least discord possible. Far from a piece 
of cake!  
Additionally, Khun Chaowalit witnessed yet another partnership of 
professionals at CDW, that of the engineers, the architects, and the interior 
designers, three closely related but distinct professionals who took great 
pride in their expertise – pride that could sometimes turned into prejudice 
against the other professions. At the same time, each party had to have 
enough respect and confidence in the other’s expertise in order to carry out 
their mutual assignment: turning conceptual design into physical reality. 
Once more, this dictated a good balance of healthy self-esteem versus 
courteous trust and respect in the other parties for the partnership to work. 
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For instance, if a design did not work out quite well in the construction 
phase, who was to blame – the designer or the builder? As far as Khun 
Chaowalit was concerned, he would prefer that his various colleagues 
resorted to the blaming game as seldom as possible. Yet, with such a 
threesome of esteemed and proud professional groups – not a piece of cake 
either. 
The above illustrate but a few examples of the myriad partnerships of 
professionals simultaneously transpiring at CDW. Moreover, these many 
professional partnerships often overlapped one another thereby complicating 
the situation even further. Given the countless professions that made up the 
CDW’s symphony orchestra – architects, designers, draftsman, engineers, 
foremen, mechanics, technicians, attorneys, accountants, quality 
controllers, and others – Khun Chaowalit and his fellow project managers 
indeed needed to constantly exercise their conductor-like skill to create a 
harmonic project execution. Even for a maestro like Khun Chaowalit, this 
was still not a piece of cake, although he apparently must somehow make it 
his cup of tea. 
 
4.3 Partnership of organizations 
Finally, Khun Chaowalit stood yet at another crucial junction in CDW’s 
operation, one between the alliance and three indispensible external parties: 
the clients, the contractors/sub-contractors, and the authority. With all 
these three external parties, he had to orchestrate still another special 
partnership where all factions must uphold their functions, while contending 
with the views of the other partner(s). 
Take CDW’s relationship with the clients, for example. Convincing the 
clients to take up the best decisions and actions possible constitutes a 
hallmark of excellent consultancy. Coming up with proficient advices was 
critical but usually straightforward, because it was after all what CDW 
professionals were trained and qualified to deliver. The architects, designers, 
engineers, mechanics, and other specialists generally had no real difficulty 
delivering expert advices vis-à-vis their professions. Yet, necessary as smart 
advices were, they in themselves were certainly not sufficient. The clients 
had to see and agree that these were indeed ‘smart’ – a matter not as 
straightforward. For one thing, what about the old adage that ‘the customer 
is always right’? Now, that is not always the case with consultancy. In fact, 
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in the consultancy business, customers cannot always be right, else why 
would they seek the consultants’ expert advice in the first place.  
Nevertheless, a client is a client is a client, and consultants must 
always walk the fine line between upholding their expertise without offending 
the clients. They must confront and challenge the clients when the clients 
are not quite right, eventually convincing the clients to take up their advices. 
The ability to handle this oxymoronic condition is the key to consultancy 
business. It requires a good interplay of confidence, trust, respect and 
assertiveness. Interestingly, Khun Karel, CDW President, observed that the 
Dutch appeared to be better at this little game, particularly when it 
concerned Dutch or Western clients who were used to separating emotion 
from subject matter, yet another reason for the need to have expatriate 
involvement. Khun Chaowalit, on the other hand, also witnessed how in 
some circumstances involving Thai clients, a touch of Thainess was often 
called for to establish good rapport. Still, for some other instances, a dose of 
opposite cultural tendency turned out to be more useful, such as when a 
stubborn Thai client would listen with less feeling of losing face to a blunt 
expert foreigner. Take the historic case mentioned earlier when Khun 
Chuchawal turned to Khun Geert to deal with a Thai client, for example. 
Khun Chuchawal suspected that as a Thai, the ‘kraeng jai’ notion could 
make it awkward, if not impossible, for him to confront the Thai client with a 
dose of strong medicine. Khun Geert, in his Dutch cloak, could deliver the 
difficult message more easily. 
All things considered, in most cases, a combined Dutch-Thai team 
proved to be the most effective for CDW. Whatever the case maybe, though, 
partnership with the clients demanded that CDW professionals must 
balance well the respect for their own professions, for their clients, and for 
the end results. These three distinct types of respect were not automatically 
in harmony and the Project Manager like Khun Chaowalit stood always at 
the center of the balancing act. 
The same applied to the partnerships with outside contractors and 
official authorities, two external parties CDW needed to constantly concur 
with who did not necessarily see eye to eye with the firm’s agenda. 
Contractors, such as construction companies or other specialists, naturally 
had their own business agendas to tend too, agendas that might or might 
not be in line with those of CDW’s. Yet CDW must work with them to ensure 
successful completion of projects, much in the same way as with the clients, 
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only maybe in a reverse fashion. Finally, CDW must also deal with 
governmental agencies on a regular basis. The need to obtain a variety of 
permits alone meant that CDW must concur with many public offices, a 
transaction where local practice and international standard must form a 
harmonious agreement. Therefore, partnership with local authority became 
another balancing act of diverse organizational cultures. 
Khun Chaowalit and other project managers functioned at the hub of all 
these partnerships: of nationals, professionals, and organizationals. Their 
main instrument to orchestrate these partnerships was to convince all 
partners that they were all in it together – for better rather than for worse, 
for richer rather than poorer. 
Thus, life went on at CDW, in spite of and because of the frictions and 
puzzles created by the odd-eyed identity of this strategic alliance. It was as it 
was and most at CDW had learned to live with or even thrive in it. Here and 
there, one may hear some jarring notes or see some out-of-step moves. But, 
after more than three decades of successful operation, CDW was certainly 
not out of tune or step in any major fashion. De wereld draait door.7 And as 
the world turned, life went on. All things considered, it seemed to be a rather 
intriguing world and rewarding life at the odd-eyed CDW – the fact that the 
alliance now ranks among the top in their industry in both the Thai and 
regional markets serves as a testimonial to this assertion.  
 
4.4 Multi-level cultural partnership as strategic trademark of CDW 
The most striking imprint of the origin and evolution of CDW was how 
cultures, in various shapes and forms, and their particular mode of crossing, 
served as a virtual trademark of competence for CDW. As a company that 
operated in an industry dependent upon perception and promise of 
competence, CDW needed to carry a prominent mark of distinction, 
something that conveyed past success as well as warranted future 
fulfilment. Success and fulfilment were of course in the eye of the beholder 
and since CDW had many groups of beholders, it needed to carry a 
trademark of competence that has many facets to attract the various 
beholders. 
Hence, multi-faceted national culture is the first distinctive trademark 
of competence for CDW. For Western or Dutch clients, Dutch ownership 
served as a trademark of international competence; for Thai clients, Thai 
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involvement that of local fluency. For all clients, its Dutch-Thai alliance 
afforded a trademark of desirable combined expertise. In all these instances, 
a particular national culture, or a unique combination thereof, served as a 
trademark of an exclusive type of proficiency, the reason Khun Karel, the 
President, emphasized the value of a ‘combined’ team, which epitomized the 
unique trademark of the total sum of CDW’s competence. 
Professional culture was of course another distinct trademark of CDW’s 
competence. Granted, most, if not all, professionals at CDW were legally 
certified; yet legal certificate was but one stamp of qualification. Generally, 
each profession has its own culture, which bonds the members of each 
profession to one another and guards them against those outside of their 
circle. The ‘guarding’ function of professional culture trademark had a 
decisive role at CDW because the firm operated in a consultancy business 
where professional advices must carry dominant weight when set against 
clients’ stance. It was not only the material capability of the professionals, 
but their authoritative aura and clout that made them an equal partner, not 
a mere servant, to the clients. Hence, CDW had to retain its ‘professional’ eye 
colour on par with that of its client – another odd-eyed instance. 
CDW also needed to blend many organizational cultures in its 
simultaneous dealing with clients, suppliers, contractors and governmental 
agencies. Each of these organizations had its organizational culture that was 
a particular blend of internal and sectoral cultures, at the very least. The 
competence of CDW as a consultancy must be constantly upheld by 
successful management of the partnership of its own organizational culture 
with those of these other establishments. As mentioned earlier, as a 
consultancy, CDW had to maintain its own standards without denting the 
prestige of these other business partners and clients – once more, an odd-
eyed sort of balance. 
 
4.4.1 The significance of context in strategic alliances 
The odd-eyed personality of CDW is thus a unique case of cultural crossing. 
The uniqueness of the odd-eyed characteristic is in its contending yet 
bonding condition. CDW needed this particular instance of cross-cultural 
identity. It created constant tension yet it provided the very lifeblood of the 
alliance’s existence. Because the odd-eyed identity was the cultural 
trademark of competence that the joint venture needed for its chosen 
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business, the alliance’s context in effect defined its operative identity and 
qualified its eventual livelihood. 
Consequently, the story of CDW illustrates vividly how significant 
context is in any cross-cultural encounter. In the final analysis, what 
matters is the total sum of a particular context. To wit, there are no two 
CDWs, so to speak, and if we want to understand what is going on at a 
particular strategic alliance, we need to take its general and specific context 
into account, simultaneously. Although all cases of a cross-cultural platform 
share the same general properties, the eventual identity of each setting is 
unique unto itself. This makes an analysis of context indispensible if we 
were to truly understand a particular case of strategic alliance. 
For example, in the case of CDW, the context defined the definite type of 
partnership and the exact mode and nature of cross-cultural condition for 
the alliance. First and foremost, the combined context of its industry and its 
niche business made the cultural odd-eyed quality a necessary trademark of 
its competence. Additionally, other conditions and entities that made up the 
alliance all contributed to how CDW was what it was. Finally and just as 
importantly, the context also defined the eventual effectiveness of the cross-
cultural condition itself. In brief, if a cross-cultural condition contributes to 
the prime objective of an alliance, then it is effective, despite and because of 
all the oddities and difficulties it creates. 
 
4.4.2 The significance of cross-cultural instrument in strategic alliances 
The case of CDW also illuminates the significance of having the right 
instrument to foster the desired (and perhaps desirable) cross-cultural mode. 
Because the reciprocal mode characterized CDW’s prevalent cross-cultural 
condition, at the time of this narration, the importance of mediator as the 
key instrument became evident. 
A mediator refers to any instrument that acts as a ‘go between’ for 
difference parties in order to render a mediate effect (Ulijn and St Amant 
2000). The need for a ‘go between’ arises from some fundamental differences 
that call for a certain level of synchronization before the parties can interact 
with a tolerable level of friction, incompatibility or detrimental side effect. A 
mediator comes in a variety of shapes and forms, each performing 
synchronization in different manners. From our study, we theorize three 
primary functions that a mediator can perform – as a bumper, a connector, 
 
31 
and a translator. Acting as a bumper is the crudest and most basic function 
of a mediator and serves a simple purpose of collision control through sheer 
diversion or absorption. A mediator, when acting as a bumper, simply 
absorbs or diverts potential frictions that result from differences. Connecting 
is the second function a mediator can perform. As a connector, a mediator 
provides a channel for exchange and reconciliation. The need for a connector 
arises from any sort of distances or incompatibilities – conceptual or 
physical – that exist among different parties. The final primary function of a 
mediator is as a interpreter. As the name implies, this mediating function 
serves to translate or, better yet, interpret meanings in one culture into their 
equivalent in another culture. The simplest example of a translator is of 
course a dictionary and the most sophisticate example of a cultural 
interpreter is arguably a cultural theorist and his or her messages. 
Various mediators were active at CDW. As we see, although the tension 
was certainly there, a mechanism must have been in place that prevented it 
from degenerating into total negativity: the mechanism came in the form of 
numerous mediators. First were the human mediators in the figures such as 
Khun Busara and Khun Chaowalit. Both actors operated at the center of 
critical activities in CDW and both acted as mediators for the many forms of 
partnerships at CDW as illustrated in the case. In the case of the co-
founders – Khun Geert and Khun Chuchawal – however, the mediator took 
the form a ‘common denominator’ that was the mutual need and 
appreciation in each other’s contributions to the partnership.  
The importance of mediator exemplified in the story of CDW provides a 
strong hint at the significance of a key instrument in cross-cultural 
interchanges. Two other types of cross-cultural instruments are indicated in 
Table 1, making up the three types of key instrument – controller, mediator, 
and hydridizer, each serving different purposes and suitable for different 
situations. The case of CDW illustrates the critical role that the right 
instrument can play in the success of a strategic alliance. Although Table 1 
locates each key instrument to a particular mode of cross-cultural condition, 
it should be noted that, as in most issues pertaining to cultural analysis, 
real world settings are never as clear-cut as a theorized taxonomy. In many, 
if not all, cross-cultural conditions, any of the key instruments may be in 
force, and even more than one instrument may be employed 
simultaneiously. Once again, the significance of context comes into play 
regarding this issue. 
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Such is our interpretation of CDW as an odd-eyed strategic alliance. 
Although we do not claim to achieve an exhaustive analysis of the case and 
our proposed theory, we believe we offer illuminating interpretations of both. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We attempt to illustrate how an interpretation of a real world case of a single 
strategic alliance could elucidate the inherent complex cross-cultural 
condition underlying strategic alliances. Our analysis is but one 
interpretation of only one particular case. Yet in the tradition of Clifford 
Geertz (1993), we believe, as Simons (1996, p. 227) espoused, that the value 
of a case study lies not in a statistical ‘sample of one’ fashion, but rather in 
its interpretive paradox, that is ‘[b]y studying the uniqueness of the 
particular, we come to understand the universal’. In the same vein, we 
believe that the particular strategic alliance that was CDW could help us 
understand more the universal of strategic alliances. 
Among the ‘universal’ that the case of CDW as an odd-eyed cat has 
illustrated are the followings. First, as stated at the very beginning, strategic 
alliances inherently dictate cultural crossing, at many levels. It follows that 
better understanding of the role culture plays and the complexity this role 
can take will enrich our collective effort in the inquiry into strategic alliances 
– their origin, development and outcome. Second, the many shapes and 
forms of cultural crossing, as proposed in our theorization, suggest that the 
range of how cultural forces can influence, or even define, the nature and 
performance of strategic alliances is not a simple cut-and-dried matter. The 
insights we gain from our study indicate that further probe into the role of 
culture could shed more lights into the effort to understand the success and 
failure of strategic alliances, when viewed from a cultural perspective. Last, 
our presentation of the odd-eyed CDW may help convince scholars in 
strategic alliances of the value that a qualitative, interpretative view of the 
issue could deepen our reading of real world phenomena and provide 
complementary insights to those that already gained by the sister 
quantitative approach. As the thick-descriptive style of the case reveals, in 
every story of a strategic alliance, multiple living actors breathe and live 
through its success or failure. In the final analysis, these actors are what 
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make or break the alliances and it seems prudent to listen carefully to the 
stories they have to tell. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 To preserve informants’ privacy and anonymity, all characters names are 
fictitious, and, to give local flavour to the narration, they are addressed in Thai’s 
convention with the Thai ‘Khun’, which is equivalent to Mr. or Mrs. in English, 
followed by the first name, except when first introduced. Character job titles follow 
what they were in real life. 
2 In Dutch, two forms of second person pronoun exist: the formal ‘u’ and the 
intimate ‘je.’ Interestingly, the Thai language has a similar, although much more 
elaborated, system of distinction in the proper use of all pronouns (a subject that 
deserves an entire chapter in itself). 
3 ‘Kraeng jai’ is one of those Thai terms and traits that are hard to translate, let 
alone explicate. Briefly, it refers to the tendency to avoid any act or word that could 
harm someone’s feeling, put him or her in an awkward position, cause him or her to 
loose face, or create inconvenience to any party involved. This usually results in an 
avoidance of direct confrontation altogether. See Komin (1991) for further details. 
4 ‘Farang’ is a Thai word for Westerner, most likely originating from the English 
word ‘foreigner’ or ‘foreign’. 
5 The terminology ‘steady state’ follows its use in the discipline of computer 
simulation in general and discrete event simulation in particular. Because of its 
relative neutrality, we prefer this term to its alternative in economics – ‘equilibrium’. 
However, we use the term here in a very broad sense and do not embrace all the 
fine properties and implications of the terminology as used in the above two 
disciplines. 
6 Feng shui is ‘(in Chinese thought), a system of laws considered to govern spatial 
arrangement and orientation in relation to the flow of energy … and whose 
favourable or unfavourable effects are taken into account when sitting and 
designing buildings’ (Oxford University Press 1989: 674) 
7 Literally, this translates into ‘The world continues to turn’. Figuratively, it has the 
same connotation as the English expression ‘Life goes on'. The daily Dutch 
television talk/variety show De Wereld Draait Door, which was running successfully 
at the time of this writing, inspired our use of it here. 
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